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Abstract
Some languages encode future timing more ambiguously than others. We identify
two economic channels through which more ambiguous reference to future timing
leads to higher levels of R&D investment. Our empirical tests on country- and
firm-level R&D investment confirm this prediction, even after controlling for an ex-
tensive set of formal and informal economic institutions and addressing endogeneity
concern in multiple ways. Tests on patent generation provide further evidence that
ambiguous reference to future timing leads to more innovation.
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1 Introduction
Institutions determine resource allocation and economic growth. While North (1991) and
Williamson (2000) highlight the importance of both formal and informal institutions, the finance
literature has traditionally focused on formal institutions such as law and investor protection.
Relatively little attention has been paid to informal institutions such as culture (Karolyi, 2016).
One of the early studies on informal institutions and finance is Stulz & Williamson (2003), who
ask an intriguing question: since overwhelming evidence shows that investor protection (a formal
institution) promotes economic growth, why does investor protection still differ substantially
across countries? They find that religion (an informal and persistent institution) is a significant
determinant of investor protection. Since then, studies of culture and finance have grown and
gained more acceptance, and culture has been generally recognized as an informal economic
institution that has wide-ranging impacts on finance.1
Language, like culture, affects cognition and decision making. In recent years, linguistics and
psychology research has produced increasing evidence that people who speak different languages
think differently.2 Is language also an economic institution that affects resource allocation
and economic outcome? To operationalize this research question, we study R&D investment.
Since at least Joseph Schumpeter, R&D investment has been recognized as a key resource
allocation decision that affects innovation and growth. Yet despite this recognition, there
remain substantial and persistent differences in the level of R&D investment across countries.
How could this be? One piece of this puzzle, as documented by numerous studies, is the
difference in formal economic institutions, such as property rights protection (e.g., Allred &
Park, 2007). The second piece lies in culture, such as individualism (Shao et al., 2013), which
is persistently different across countries. Some language features, when compared with various
cultural attributes, are even more persistent. We hypothesize that another piece of the puzzle
lies in language.
The particular language feature that underlies our hypothesis is future-time reference (FTR),
1 See reviews on culture and finance by Aggarwal et al. (2016).
2This is the central hypothesis of linguistic relativity. For example, see reviews by Boroditsky (2011) and
Wolff & Holmes (2011).
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which refers to how explicitly a language marks future timing. Strong-FTR languages, such
as English and French, have explicit tense to mark the future. For example, when referring to
future timing in English, the usage of future tense as denoted by will or going to is grammatically
obligatory. In contrast, weak-FTR languages, such as German or Chinese, have no tense and no
obligatory marking of future timing. Another way to think about the difference is that compared
to strong-FTR languages, weak-FTR languages have more ambiguous reference to future timing.
Boroditsky (2001) finds that language is most powerful in shaping thought about abstract
domains like time. Chen (2013), in a pioneering study that links language to economic decision
making, finds that individuals speaking weak-FTR languages exhibit more long-term-oriented
behavior, such as saving more for retirement and making more health-conscious decisions.
Chen’s findings notwithstanding, more evidence is needed to establish language as an eco-
nomic institution. Specifically, does language FTR affect resource allocation at the firm and
country levels? And if so, through what channels, and what are the real economic consequences?
Also importantly, how distinct is the language effect from the cultural effects that have been
documented in the literature, such as the effects of religion, trust, and individualism? R&D
investment provides a suitable setting to study these questions.
Why do we expect language FTR features to affect R&D investment? R&D is long-term
investment with highly uncertain rewards. Given the long-term and uncertain nature, there
are two economic channels through which FTR can affect the level of R&D investment, and
both channels suggest that weak FTR (i.e., more ambiguous reference to future timing) leads
to higher levels of R&D investment.
The first channel is “time preference”. Time preference means that to a weak-FTR language
speaker, the future seems closer, and thus the present value of a future reward appears larger,
which leads to higher current investment. Panel A in Figure 1 illustrates this channel. The
second channel is “reward-timing uncertainty”. Speakers of weak-FTR languages, because of
their ambiguous marking of future timing, perceive greater uncertainty in future timing. This
perceived reward-timing uncertainty, combined with the convexity of the time discount function,
leads to a higher perceived present value of future rewards, and therefore higher investment.
This effect, illustrated in Panel B in Figure 1, is analogous to Jensen’s Inequality. In the
2
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hypothesis-development section, we present a more rigorous illustration of these two channels.
But it is worth emphasizing that both channels suggest that weak FTR leads to higher R&D
investment, which is our main empirical hypothesis.
Our central finding is that weak FTR is associated with significantly higher R&D investment
and patent generation. Is the association between FTR and R&D causal? Since language FTR
features are highly stable over time (Roberts et al., 2015), reverse causality running from R&D
to FTR is unlikely. Therefore, potential endogeneity can only arise from omitted correlated
variables. We tackle this identification challenge in four ways. First, we perform a cross-
country analysis while controlling for a wide range of country characteristics that are potentially
correlated with language and may also affect R&D investment. These characteristics include
economic and financial-market development, legal origin, investor rights protection, patent
protection, and various cultural attributes. Employing a panel data set of 52 countries during
1996-2013, we find robust evidence that weak FTR is statistically and economically related
to higher levels of R&D investment. The p-value is below 0.1% in most specifications, and
depending on the regression specification, weak FTR is related to a business-sector R&D/GDP
ratio that is 20%-30% above the sample mean.
Since the FTR measure is time invariant, we are not able to control for country fixed
effects. Is it likely that a country omitted variable is driving the positive relation between
FTR and R&D investment? Note that the strong- vs. weak-FTR classification groups together
many countries that have drastically different cultural, legal, political, historical, and economic
attributes. For example, weak-FTR countries include Brazil, China, Germany, and Japan. For
a country omitted variable to drive the result, this omitted variable needs to be distinct from
the variables that are already controlled for and needs to exert a common effect across all these
countries. In addition , this omitted variable also needs to exert a common effect (in the opposite
direction) across strong-FTR countries, which is a diverse group that includes Argentina, Israel,
South Korea, and United States. In light of extant literature, it is difficult to conceive what
this omitted correlated variable might be.
To further alleviate the concern about omitted-variable bias, we conduct a second set of
tests at the firm level. This allows us to control for firm characteristics that affect R&D and are
3
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potentially correlated with FTR. The firm-level sample consists of over 31,000 firms from 34
countries and spans from 1985 to 2013. After controlling for important firm characteristics that
affect R&D (firm size, leverage, market-to-book, operating profit, cash holdings, asset tangibil-
ity, and capital intensity), FTR continues to exhibit a statistically significant and economically
large effect on R&D. The p-value is consistently below 0.1%, and depending on the regression
specification, weak FTR is related to a R&D/Assets ratio that is 20%-36% above the sample
mean.
Our third identification strategy is to use pre-1500 CE crop return as an instrumental
variable for Weak-FTR. Galor et al. (2018) show that pre-1500 CE crop return is positively as-
sociated with the use of periphrastic future tense in a language. Consistent with their finding,
we find that pre-1500 CE Crop Return is negatively associated with Weak-FTR. The instru-
mented Weak-FTR has a significantly positive effect on both country-level and firm-level R&D
investment.
Our fourth identification strategy is to conduct within-country tests. This essentially con-
trols for all observable and unobservable country-level attributes and directly addresses the
concern about country-level omitted-variable bias. We identify a group of CEOs of U.S. firms
that have non-U.S. nationalities with weak-FTR languages. Employing a propensity score
methodology, we match these CEOs with a control group of strong-FTR CEOs on multiple
firm characteristics. We find that firms with CEOs who have weak-FTR nationalities invest
significantly more in R&D.3
Overall, the country-level, firm-level, and within-country tests provide robust empirical ev-
idence, consistent with our theoretical prediction that weak FTR leads to higher R&D invest-
ment. These findings survive numerous robustness checks, including alternative measures of
language FTR, alternative regression specifications, subperiod tests, and a correlated-random-
effects model that explicitly controls for country-level omitted correlated variables. We also
examine patent generation as an alternative measure of innovation activity and find consistent
evidence that weak FTR is associated with significantly more patent generation. Despite all the
3We conduct two more within-country tests and find consistent results. The first test exploits the language
difference within Belgium, and the second test exploits the handover of Hong Kong from U.K. to China.
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evidence, we acknowledge that without an exogenous shock that produces random assignment
of weak- vs. strong-FTR languages, we cannot definitively conclude causality. As we discussed
earlier, however, the bar is high for a correlated omitted variable to explain away the findings.
In recent years, the linguistic relativity literature has produced “a solid body of empirical
evidence showing how languages shape thinking ” (Boroditsky, 2011, p. 63). Chen (2013) docu-
ments that language is associated with individuals’ economic behavior. We extend Chen’s work
and document how linguistic features can affect resource allocation at corporate and coun-
try levels. R&D investment is crucial to generate innovation and support economic growth.
Therefore, the evidence that linguistic features affect R&D and patent generation suggests that
language is an important economic institution, similar to the now widely accepted notion that
culture is an important economic institution. The language effect is robust to an extensive set
of culture proxies, suggesting that the language effect is distinct from the culture effects that
have been documented in the literature.
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on how language affects economic decision
making. Guin (2016) and Paule-Paludkiewicz et al. (2016) confirm Chen’s linguistic-savings
hypothesis. Chen et al. (2017) find similar savings behavior by corporations. Pérez & Tavits
(2017) survey a group of bilingual speakers and randomly assign the language used in the
survey (weak- or strong-FTR). They find that when being asked in the weak-FTR language,
the subjects are more likely to support future-oriented policies. In accounting literature, Fasan
et al. (2016) and Kim et al. (2017) find that firms in weak-FTR countries are less likely to engage
in earnings management. In a recent survey on linguistic structures and economic outcomes,
Mavisakalyan & Weber (2017) review more evidence that language affects the cognitive process
and decision making.4
The literature on language and institutions is in its infancy. But just as psychology and
sociology (culture) have enriched our understanding of finance and economics, language can
4Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of corporate innovation (e.g.,
Hsu et al., 2014; Luong et al., 2017; Bhattacharya et al., 2017) by suggesting that the language of corporate
managers is an important driver of corporate R&D investment. In addition, our study adds to the literature
on the positive relation between R&D and firm stock returns (e.g., Cohen et al., 2013; Gu, 2016; Croce et al.,
2019). Specifically, our evidence suggests that the language of corporate managers may affect stock returns
through decisions on R&D investment.
5
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potentially provide new vantage points. A particular challenge, however, is to identify the
economic channels that link linguistic features to economic decisions and outcomes. We provide
plausible theoretical explanations of how a language’s FTR feature affects R&D investment,
but a different theoretical explanation may be required for another language feature or another
economic outcome. Viewing this challenge through a more optimistic lens, we heed Oliver
Williamson’s recommendation that while “awaiting a unified theory, we should be accepting of
pluralism” (Williamson, 2000, p.595).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our main hypothesis and
describes the empirical models. Section 3 examines the effect of language FTR on country-level
R&D investment. Section 4 examines the effect of language FTR on firm-level R&D investment.
Section 5 addresses endogeneity concerns and conducts further robustness checks. Section
6 tests the relation between language FTR and country-level innovation outputs. Section 7
concludes.
2 Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Language FTR
Future-time reference (FTR) describes how explicitly a language encodes the timing of
future events, and FTR differs substantially across languages (Dahl, 2000). A strong-FTR
language speaker is required to grammatically mark future time, while a weak-FTR language
speaker does not need to grammatically distinguish between the present and the future. For
example, in the sentence It will/is going to be cloudy tomorrow, English marks the future using
“will/is going to”. It is grammatically wrong to use the present tense of the copula, “is”, to talk
about the weather tomorrow. However, in Chinese there are no tenses. Chinese speakers can
simply replace jintian (today) with mingtian (tomorrow) without changing any other part of the
sentence.5 Among the main languages, German, Chinese, and Japanese have weak FTR, while
English, French, and Spanish have strong FTR. Appendix I summarizes FTR classification for
the 52 countries in our sample.
5See Chen (2013) for a more detailed discussion on how different languages mark time differently.
6
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English and Chinese speakers talk about the weather today :
English speaker: It is cloudy today.
Chinese speaker (pinyin): Jintian shi duoyun.
Chinese (translation): Today is cloudy.
English and Chinese speakers talk about the weather tomorrow :
English speaker: It will/is going to be cloudy tomorrow.
Chinese speaker (pinyin): Mingtian shi duoyun.
Chinese (translation): Tomorrow is cloudy.
The difference in FTR can cause at least two effects. First, relative to a strong-FTR speaker,
a weak-FTR speaker likely has a more blurred distinction between present and future, and may
perceive future events closer to the present. When discounting a future reward, it is conceivable
that the weak-FTR speaker will apply a smaller discount factor and hence perceive a higher
present value. This is the “time preference” effect. Second, relative to a strong-FTR speaker,
a weak-FTR speaker likely has a less precise, or more ambiguous, perception about future
timing. That is, the weak-FTR speaker may perceive a wider distribution in the timing of a
future reward. This is the “timing uncertainty” effect.
Do language features actually influence how the speaker think and behave? The linguistic
relativity hypothesis (LRH), also known as Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (Whorf, 1956), says yes. The
debate of whether LRH holds true went on for the better part of the 20th century. But since the
1990s, the linguistics and psychology literatures have produced increasing evidence supporting
LRH. The question of whether language features, particularly how a language encodes time,
affect economic behavior does not attract much attention until Chen (2013). He finds that
weak-FTR language speakers save more and make more health-conscious decisions.
There is limited evidence, however, that language FTR affects resource allocation at firm
or country level. We next develop the hypothesis on how FTR can affect R&D investment
decisions.
7
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2.2 Hypothesis Development
Based on Chen (2013), we first develop a simple model to show how time preference and
timing uncertainty can affect a manager’s perception of the timing of future rewards and hence
the decision on R&D investment.
Consider a firm with an R&D project. By investing x today, the firm will be rewarded R(x)
at time t. We assume that the reward function R is increasing and concave in x, i.e., R′(x) > 0
and R′′(x) < 0, reflecting diminishing return to scale from R&D investment. As one of the key
features of R&D investment, the reward time, t, is uncertain.6 Let t follow a distribution F (t),
defined in interval [0, +∞].
The firm maximizes its net expected profit:
max
x




e−δt R(x) dF (t) (1)





e−δt dF (t) = 1 (2)
From Equation (2), we can solve for the optimal R&D investment, x∗. Given the project (and
hence the R function), this optimal investment is determined by the discount rate δ and the
distribution function F (t).
First, a lower discount rate increases the present value of the reward and hence increases the
















te−δt dF (t) < 0 (3)
Notice that R′′(x∗) < 0, so ∂x∗/∂δ < 0. That is, x∗ increases as δ decreases. If a weak-FTR
speaker perceives the future to be closer to the present, she will apply a smaller δ, perceive a
higher x∗, and therefore make higher investment in R&D. This is the “time preference” channel,
6Another key feature of R&D is that the level of reward is uncertain. For simplicity, we consider only
deterministic reward. Randomizing R does not change the conclusion of the model.
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which we illustrate in Panel A of Figure 1.
Second, due to the convexity of the exponential function (in terms of t), a “wider” distribution
F (t) (i.e., a greater timing uncertainty of the reward) increases the present value of the reward,
and hence increases current investment. To see this, consider two distributions, F1(t) and F2(t).
Assume F2(t) exhibits more uncertainty than F1(t) in the sense that F2(t) is a mean-preserving
spread (MPS) of F1(t) (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970). As −e
−δt is a strictly concave function of


















Combining (5) and (2), we have R′(x∗1) > R




2. That is, due to the
convexity of the time discount function, greater reward-timing uncertainty increases the optimal
R&D investment.8 This is the “timing uncertainty” channel, which we illustrate in Panel B of
Figure 1.
We use a more specific example to further illustrate the intuition of the two channels.
Suppose that F (t) has only two values, T − ǫ and T + ǫ, with equal probabilities, where ǫ is a
positive number, capturing timing uncertainty. A higher ǫ indicates a higher timing uncertainty.
Applying Equation (2), we have
1
2
· e−δT · (eǫ + e−ǫ) · R′(x∗) = 1






g(t) dF2(t). The proof can be seen in Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970).
8This relationship can be illustrated using a simple example. Suppose an R&D investment today (time 0)
is expected to generate one unit of cash flow at time 2, and the discount factor is β (0 < β < 1). The present
value of this future reward is thus β2. Now suppose the timing of the future reward is perceived to be uncertain:
it may occur at time 1 or time 3. The present value thus becomes (β + β3)/2. It is straightforward to see that
(β + β3)/2 > β2 because (β + β3)/2 − β2 = β(1 − β)2/2 > 0. That is, reward-timing uncertainty increases the
present value of the payoff, and therefore encourages R&D investment.
9




















Equations (6) and (7) respectively show that the optimal investment is determined by the
discount rate (i.e., time preference) δ and timing uncertainty ǫ.
As Chen (2013) argues, time preference and timing uncertainty are the two channels through
which language FTR can affect individuals’ savings and health decisions. Both of these two
channels, as we illustrate above, suggest that weak FTR leads to higher R&D investment, which
is our main testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis: Weak FTR leads to higher R&D investment.
2.3 Empirical Design and Main Variables
To test our hypothesis, we conduct cross-country analysis at both the country and firm
levels. At the country level, we implement the following empirical model:
R&Dkt = α + β ·Weak-FTRk + ΩXkt + ǫkt (8)
R&Dkt is R&D expenditures of country k in year t. We use two measures of national R&D
expenditures: (1) aggregate R&D of the business sector as a percentage of GDP (Business
R&D/GDP), and (2) aggregate R&D as a percentage of GDP (Total R&D/GDP).Weak-FTRk
is a binary variable that equals 1 if the main language of a country is classified as a weak-FTR
language, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we replace this binary variable by two continuous
measures of FTR strength, Verb Ratio and Sentence Ratio, developed by Chen (2013). The
ratios are defined respectively as the frequency of verbs and sentences that are grammatically
future-marked in weather forecasts of various languages. By construction, they are inverse
measures of weak-FTR and range from zero to one. The above variables are defined in Panels
A and B of Appendix II.
Xkt is a set of country-specific control variables, including economic, legal, cultural, and
10
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religious variables. First, the three economic variables are the logarithm of GDP per capita
in U.S. dollars (GDP per capita), stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (Stock
Market), and domestic credit to private sectors as a percentage of GDP (Credit Market ). Low
GDP countries are typically less innovative and invest less in R&D. Including GDP per capita
in the regression controls for such an effect. Stock and credit markets are important for a
country’s financial development that affects R&D (e.g., Maskus et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2014).
Second, the legal variables consist of legal origins (La Porta et al., 2008) and proxies for
protection of Shareholder Rights, Creditor Rights, and Patent Rights, defined by Djankov et al.
(2007); Djankov et al. (2008); and Park (2008). Countries in our sample belong to four legal
origins: UK, French, German, and Scandinavia.
Third, we control for important cultural attributes including Individualism, Uncertainty
Avoidance, Masculinity, Power Distance, and Long-term Orientation (Hofstede, 1984, 2001).
In addition, we control for Trust because trust affects the development of financial markets
(Guiso et al., 2008) and hence may affect investment in R&D. Various studies have shown that
culture affects firms’ investment policy (e.g., Li et al., 2013; Shao et al., 2013; Ahern et al.,
2015).
Fourth, the religious variable (Catholic) is a dummy indicating whether the majority of a
country’s inhabitants are catholic. All the country-level control variables are defined in Panel
D of Appendix II. We also control for continent fixed effects, as different languages within a
continent may share similar components. For example, the Chinese language has influenced
the languages of Japan and Korea.
At the firm level, we run the following OLS regression:
R&Dikt = α + β ·Weak-FTRk + ΩXkt + ΓZikt + ǫikt (9)
where R&Dikt is R&D investment of firm i of country k in year t. We construct two measures
of firm R&D investment, R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales, defined as R&D expenditures divided
by total assets or sales. We replace missing R&D values by zero. Koh & Reeb (2015) document
that over 10% of U.S. firms with missing R&D in their financial statements receive patents,
11
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so it might be problematic to recode all missing R&D as zero. Following Koh & Reeb (2015),
we include a dummy variable indicating missing R&D (R&D-missing). Xkt includes country-
specific control variables, as described above. Zikt includes firm-specific control variables, such
as Firm Size, Tangibility, Profitability, Leverage, Market-to-Book ratio, Capital Intensity, and
Cash Ratio, which may all affect R&D investment (e.g., Brown et al., 2009). We also control
for CF Volatility, defined as the industry-average standard deviation of firm profitability in the
past five years. CF Volatility is a proxy for reward-size uncertainty and is expected to have a
negative effect on firm R&D investment. All these control variables are defined in Panel C of
Appendix II. We also control for industry, year, and continent fixed effects, and cluster standard
errors at the firm level.
3 Country-level R&D Investment
3.1 Data, Sample, and Statistics
We obtain data on national R&D investment between 1996 and 2013 from United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. 9 The full
sample has 52 countries on six continents, including almost all large economies of the world.
Among them, 15 are classified as countries with weak-FTR languages.
As mentioned earlier, we construct a large set of country-level economic, legal, cultural, and
religious variables. Table 1 presents summary statistics. Business R&D and total R&D are on
average 1% and 1.5% of GDP. 29% of the country-year observations are of weak FTR. Summary
statistics of the rest are comparable to related studies in the literature.
We compute time-series average of Business R&D/GDP for each country. We tabulate the
averages in Appendix I and plot them in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows that R&D appears to be
higher for weak-FTR countries. Seven of the top 10 countries are weak-FTR countries, while
among the bottom 20 countries only one country is a weak-FTR country. We also find a similar
pattern in Figure 3, which shows each country’s average Total R&D/GDP. Of course, although
the univariate comparisons are suggestive, we need to control for plausible determinants of R&D
9The data are downloadable at http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/BrowseScience.aspx
12
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that are also potentially correlated with language FTR. But first we want to see how distinct
FTR is from all these determinants.
Table 2 reports the correlation between FTR and a host of economic, cultural, legal, and
religious variables. First, as expected, Weak-FTR is negatively correlated with the two inverse
measures of language FTR, Verb Ratio and Sentence Ratio. Second, Weak-FTR seems to
be sufficiently distinct from the set of control variables, including those proxies for informal
economic institutions of culture and religion.
3.2 FTR and Country-level R&D Investment
Table 3 reports the regression result of Equation (8). Column (1) shows that Weak-FTR
is positively associated with Business R&D/GDP when controlling for economic and financial
market development. In Columns (2)-(3) we progressively add controls of formal economic insti-
tutions (legal and property-rights protection) and informal economic institutions (culture and
religion). It is interesting to note that the magnitude and statistical significance of Weak-FTR
coefficient increases substantially after we control for culture attributes in Column (3). That
is, not only is the language effect not subsumed by the culture effects, it actually becomes more
distinctive when the culture effects are controlled for. This suggests that language FTR likely
captures a new aspect of informal institution than those captured by the culture attributes. In
Column (4) we control for continent and year fixed effects. The coefficient of Weak-FTR re-
mains highly significant and economically large. The coefficient of 0.002 in Column (4) suggests
that weak-FTR countries on average have 0.2 percentage-points higher Business R&D/GDP ra-
tio, which is 20% of the sample mean of 1% (based on the summary statistics in Table 1). In
Columns (5)-(8) we use Total R&D/GDP as dependent variable and obtain similar finding.
The coefficients on the control variables are mostly consistent across specifications. R&D is
positively associated with the level of economic development – in all columns GDP per capita
has a positive coefficient. Stock market development, Stock Market, has a negative coefficient.
This may seem counterintuitive because stock market financing should be supportive of R&D
financing. We do find that without other control variables, Stock Market has a significantly
positive coefficient. Other cross-country studies also find that in a multivariate setting, stock
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market capitalization is negatively related to R&D investment (e.g., Shao et al., 2013). Share-
holder and creditor rights are negatively related to R&D, consistent with findings in prior
literature (e.g., Li et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2011). In contrast, Patent Rights is positively as-
sociate with R&D because stronger patent protection allows innovators to retain more benefits
from their R&D investment (Varsakelis, 2001; Czarnitzki & Toole, 2011).
Among the culture variables, Individualism is not significant in explaining Business R&D af-
ter controlling for fixed effects, but is significantly positively in explaining total R&D, consistent
with the finding in Shao et al. (2013). Uncertainty Avoidance is insignificant after controlling
for fixed effects. Power Distance has a negative and significant effect on R&D investment.
This could be attributed to the fact that in low power distance societies, social mobility is rela-
tively stronger. To improve social status, people in low power distance countries need to invest
more in technology and knowledge (Varsakelis, 2001). Masculinity has an ambiguous relation
with R&D. As expected, Long-term Orientation is positively related to R&D because R&D
investment requires long-term commitment. Trust is negatively related to R&D, which seems
to be consistent with the findings in Helliwell (1996) and Roth (2009) that trust is negatively
related to economic growth. Finally, Catholic-dominated countries on average have lower levels
of R&D expenditures, perhaps because Catholics have higher levels of risk aversion (Halek &
Eisenhauer, 2001).
Notwithstanding various possible explanations on the control variables, the main empirical
finding on language FTR is consistent with our theoretical prediction and also suggests that
the effect of language FTR is distinct from the effects of other formal and informal institutions.
Is the effect of FTR on R&D causal? According to John Stuart Mill (1884), one can infer
causality when (1) the cause precedes the effect, (2) the cause is related to the effect, and (3)
there is no other explanation for the effect other than the cause. For our case, the first two
criteria are satisfied, so the challenge is to satisfy the third one. Theoretically, we provide an
explanation of why FTR can affect R&D investment. Empirically, the main concern is that
some country-level omitted variable is causing spurious correlation between FTR and R&D.
But what might this omitted variable be?
As mentioned earlier, for a country omitted variable to drive the result, this omitted variable
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needs to be distinct from the variables that are already controlled for. More importantly, it
needs to exert a common effect across weak-FTR countries, which have drastically different
cultural, legal, political, historical, and economic attributes. In addition, this omitted variable
also needs to exert a common effect (in the opposite direction) across strong-FTR countries.
So the bar seems high for such an omitted variable to drive the finding.
A country-fixed-effects specification will go a long way to address the omitted variable
concern. Unfortunately, FTR is time invariant and will be perfectly collinear with country
fixed effects. We address the omitted variable concern in three additional ways. First, in
Section 4 we conduct firm-level tests and control for additional firm-level characteristics that
are known determinants of R&D and may also be correlated with FTR. Second, in Section
5 we perform 2SLS regressions and within-country tests. The within-country tests essentially
control for all country-level characteristics, observable or not.
4 Firm-level R&D Investment
4.1 Data, Sample, and Statistics
We obtain firm accounting and financial data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope database.
The Worldscope database offers fundamental data on the world’s leading public companies and
covers more than 95% of global market capitalization. We restrict our sample to the primary
quotes (i.e., non-cross-listings), and exclude financial firms (ICB code 8000) and utility firms
(ICB code 7000). We further delete firm-years with missing data for any of the firm-specific and
country-specific control variables used in Equation (9). This results in a final sample consisting
of 34 countries, 31,650 firms and 215,877 observations for the 1985-2013 period. We start our
sample from 1985 because Worldscope coverage is relatively limited prior to 1985. We winsorize
all firm-level variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme outliers.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for firm-level R&D investment. The sample means
for R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales are 2.5% and 4.2%. 34.9% of the observations are of weak
FTR. The two alternative FTR measures, Verb Ratio and Sentence Ratio, have means of 54%
and 60% with sufficiently wide standard deviation, suggesting that our observations are not
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concentrated on any one type of countries (weak- or strong-FTR).
4.2 FTR and Firm-level R&D Investment
Table 5 reports regression result of Equation (9). In Column (1), we regress R&D/Assets
on Weak-FTR and country-level variables as well as continent fixed effects. Column (2) fur-
ther controls for industry fixed effects and a set of firm-specific variables that are potential
determinants of R&D, including firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, financial leverage,
market-to-book ratio, capital intensity, cash ratio, and cash-flow volatility. Column (3) further
controls for year fixed effects. In Columns (4)-(6), we use R&D/Sales as dependent variable.
The consistent result is that weak FTR is associated with significantly higher R&D. Based on
the result in Column (3), firms in weak-FTR countries invest 0.8 percentage points higher in
R&D, which is one third of the sample mean of 2.5%.
The coefficient estimates of some firm-specific control variables also warrant some discus-
sion. First, Firm Size and Profitability both have a negative coefficient, consistent with previous
studies (e.g., Barker & Mueller, 2002; Hitt et al., 1991). Second, high leverage is negatively
associated with R&D investment because firms are often reluctant to invest in long-term and
risky R&D projects if they face high financial distress costs associated with high debt levels.
Third, the positive coefficient of Market-to-Book suggests that firms with greater growth oppor-
tunities invest more in R&D (e.g., Ryan & Wiggins, 2002). The positive coefficient of Capital
Intensity indicates that highly capital-intensive firms are often in industrial or manufacturing
sectors rather than service sectors and therefore tend to be more R&D intensive (Hirshleifer
et al., 2012). The positive relation between Cash Ratio and R&D investment is consistent with
the well-established notion that firms finance R&D largely with internal funds. Finally, CF
Volatility is negatively associated with R&D investment, consistent with real-options theory
that reward-size uncertainty increases the option value of waiting and therefore lowers current
investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
In Table 6, we employ two alternative measures of language FTR, Verb Ratio and Sentence
Ratio. As expected, these two inverse measures of Weak-FTR have significantly negative effects
on R&D. These firm-level results corroborate the country-level results and further alleviate the
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omitted variable concern.
4.3 Correlated Random Effects
If we take a look at Equation (9) and think through the potential endogeneity caused by an
omitted correlated variable, it is possible that some country-level unobservable heterogeneity,
call it ak, is hidden in ǫikt in the following form: ǫikt = ak + uikt, where ak is correlated
with Weak-FTRk, and uikt is the idiosyncratic error term. We cannot explicitly control for
ak through a country-fixed-effects model because the country FEs will be perfectly collinear
with Weak-FTRk. It is plausible that (1) ak affects both Weak-FTRk and the control variables
Xkt and Zikt, and (2) ak’s effects on Xkt and Zikt and its effect on Weak-FTRk are correlated.
If so, controlling for ak’s effects on Xkt and Zikt will (at least partly) control for ak’s effects
on Weak-FTRk. To operationalize this reasoning, we implement a correlated-random-effects
(CRE) model as follows.
Suppose ak = a + ΠX̄k + ΦZ̄ik + rk, where the overbar denotes the time averages of the
control variables X and Z, and rk is the remaining country effect that is unrelated to X or Z.
We run a CRE model by explicitly controlling for X̄k and Z̄ik in Equation (9). This way we
have fully corrected the bias caused by ak on the coefficient estimates of Xkt and Zikt. If the
two assumptions in the previous paragraph hold, we will have also (partly) controlled for the
effect of the omitted variable on Weak-FTRk. See Wooldridge (2013) Section 14.3 for a more
detailed, yet succinct, explanation on CRE.10
Table 7 reports the CRE-model result by running Equation (9) while also controlling for the
time averages of all the timing-varying control variables. All the time averages have significant
coefficients, suggesting that these time averages are indeed correlated with R&D investment.
More relevant to our interest, the coefficients on Weak-FTR remain highly significant and
actually become larger. For example, in Column (1) the coefficient on Weak-FTR is 0.010 vs.
0.008 as in Column (3) of Table 5.
Interpretation of the CRE result depends on one’s confidence in the two assumptions earlier.
10As explained in Wooldridge (2013), including the time averages of Xkt and Zikt is equivalent to controlling
for FEs for Xkt and Zikt. The benefit of a CRE model over a FE model is that we can estimate the effect of a
time-invariant variable, which in our case is Weak-FTRk.
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While we think the assumptions are plausible, the exact extent to which the CRE model
mitigates the omitted-variable bias is unknowable. So caution is warranted when interpreting
the CRE result. Nevertheless, we take comfort in that the coefficient estimates on Weak-FTR
actually increase in the CRE model, and therefore regard the CRE result as one piece of evidence
consistent with our central prediction and with the rest of the empirical evidence.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In Table 8, we conduct the following robustness checks.
Non-US firms. Over 25% of observations in our sample are U.S. firms. Since language
FTR is invariant within a country, a large presence of U.S. observations may have overly
influenced the estimation. We rerun the test by excluding U.S. firms. The effect of Weak-FTR
on R&D remains positive and highly significant.
Subperiods. We also run the test for three subperiods of 1985-1999, 2000-2007, and 2008-
2013, and find consistent results. All the coefficients on Weak-FTR are positive and statistically
significant.
Excluding observations with missing R&D. In our main analysis, we replace missing
R&D values with zero and control for a dummy for missing R&D. We rerun the tests with only
observations with non-missing R&D. We still find a positive and significant relation between
Weak-FTR and firm R&D.
The adoption of IFRS.Many firms in various countries started following the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) during our sample period. The adoption of IFRS makes
accounting information more comparable across countries (e.g., Daske et al., 2008) and may
affect corporate R&D policies by changing credit supply. We include a binary variable, IFRS,
which equals to one if a firm follows IFRS instead of local accounting standards. The coefficient
estimate on Weak-FTR remains positive and highly significant.
Tobit model. Firm R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales ratios are limited at the lower bound
of zero. In such case, the OLS estimator may be biased and a Tobit maximum likelihood
specification may be more appropriate. We run Tobit regressions and find consistent results.
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The coefficient estimates on Weak-FTR remain positive and highly significant, and in most
cases become larger.
Controlling for lagged R&D. One way to mitigate the omitted-variable bias is to control
for lagged dependent variable. To the extent that the effect from the omitted variable is
persistent over time, the lagged dependent variable will subsume a significant portion of the
effect of the omitted variable. But this specification is punishing for other explanatory variables
because a significant portion of their effects will also be subsumed by the lagged dependent
variable. We control for lagged R&D and find that the coefficient estimate on Weak-FTR
remains positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.001).
4.5 Time Preference or Reward-timing Uncertainty?
Earlier we outlined two economic channels, both predicting that weak FTR leads to higher
R&D investment. The first channel is time preference, and the second channel is reward-timing
uncertainty. Although both channels lead to the same prediction, it will be informative to
examine the relative importance of these two channels. To this end, we conduct two tests.
First, we control for a measure of time preference, defined as the percentage of survey
participants in each country who prefer a larger but later payment rather than a smaller but
sooner payment (Wang et al., 2016). Intuitively, people with stronger time preference tend to
discount future payoff less. We find that the correlation between the time preference measure
and weak FTR is 0.6. If weak FTR mainly captures stronger time preference, controlling for
another measure of time preference should reduce the significance of weak FTR. The results
in Column (1) of Table 9 show that the coefficient of Weak-FTR actually becomes larger in
magnitude and remains highly significant, suggesting that time preference is probably not the
main channel at work.
Second, we compare the effect of FTR on R&D with the effect on another major type of
long-term investment, capital expenditures (Capex). Although both types of investment are
for the long term, Capex, relative to R&D, has much less reward-timing uncertainty. This is
because any serious Capex decision involves a capital budgeting process that explicitly lays
out the expected timing of future cash flows. This explicit forecasting process likely breaks
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down the timing ambiguity related to weak FTR. In contrast, the capital budgeting process for
R&D investment is less explicit because payoff timing from R&D is inherently more uncertain.
Therefore, R&D decision is more subjective, and the timing ambiguity imbedded in a language’s
FTR is more likely to be at work. If weak FTR mainly captures time preference, it should have
a positive effect on both R&D and Capex. In contrast, if weak FTR mainly captures reward-
timing uncertainty, it should have a more pronounced effect on R&D than on Capex.
Columns (2)-(3) of Table 9 reports the finding. Weak-FTR has no effect on Capex, but a
significantly positive effect on the ratio of R&D over the sum of R&D and Capex. Thus, the
effect of FTR on R&D seems to come through the channel of reward-timing uncertainty, not
the channel of time preference. We acknowledge that to distinguish these two channels, we
ideally want to observe objective measurements of time preference and timing uncertainty, and
then estimate the effect of each. Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to do this.
Thus, the evidence here should be viewed as suggestive rather than definitive. Separating the
two channels remains a rewarding topic for future research.
5 Further Endogeneity and Robustness Tests
We have documented that weak FTR is positively associated with R&D investment. As
already discussed, reverse causality running from R&D to FTR is unlikely. Therefore we
have focused on addressing the omitted-variable concern through controlling for a large set
of country- and firm-level characteristics as well as unobservable country effects through a
correlated-random-effects model. In this section, we attempt to further address endogeneity is-
sues using the instrumental variable approach and several within-country tests. We also provide
a battery of additional robustness tests of both country-level and firm-level evidence.
5.1 2SLS
Galor et al. (2018) show that pre-1500CE crop return has a positive effect on the use of
periphrastic future tense in a language. We thus use the historical Crop Return, which measures
the average pre-1500CE annual crop yield, as an instrumental variable for language FTR in our
20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518795 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262822 
2SLS regressions.11 We find that Crop Return has a significantly negative effect on Weak-FTR,
as shown in the first-stage regressions of Table 10. The first-stage F-statistics are well above
10, suggesting strong IV. In the second-stage regressions, the instrumented Weak-FTR has a
significantly positive effect on both country-level and firm-level R&D investment. 12 These 2SLS
results confirm our baseline evidence and suggest a causal relation between language FTR and
R&D investment at both the firm and country levels.
5.2 Within-country Tests
Next, we further address the omitted-variable concern by conducting within-country tests,
which essentially control for all country-level effects, whether observable or unobservable.
5.2.1 The United States
Our tests so far assume that firm managers within a country speak the same language. In
reality, managers in the same country may have different national origins and different home
languages. For example, although all CEOs in the U.S. may speak English in their working
environment, those from weak-FTR countries might be influenced by their native languages
when making decisions. Boroditsky (2001) finds that “ one’s native language appears to exert a
strong influence over how one thinks about abstract domains like time ” (p. 18). As the U.S. is a
highly internationalized country with a large proportion of immigrants, we are able to collect a
sufficient sample of CEOs with non-U.S. nationalities, especially those from weak-FTR language
countries.
We collect information on CEO nationality from BoardEx. We limit our sample period
to 1991-2013 because observations from early years contain very few weak-FTR observations.
We then exclude observations from industries that have no weak-FTR CEOs. This results in
19,946 observations. Among them, 229 are identified to have CEO nationalities with weak-FTR
languages. Since the proportion of weak-FTR observations is low, we might be picking up other
firm characteristics if we simply compare the two subsamples of weak- vs. strong-FTR CEOs.
For this reason, we employ a propensity-score-matching approach.
11See Galor & Özak (2016) for more details on the construction of Crop Return.
12We thank the reviewer for suggesting this test.
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We first estimate the probability or the propensity score of a firm having a weak-FTR
CEO by regressing an indicator variable for whether there is a weak-FTR CEO on firm size,
leverage, market-to-book ratio, profitability, tangibility, capital intensity, and industry and year
dummies. We then match each observation with a weak-FTR CEO to an observation with a
strong-FTR CEO based on the propensity score. We conduct the match without replacement,
and the maximum difference in the propensity score allowed for a match is 1%. This results in
a sample of 458 firm-years, in which 229 firm-years with weak-FTR CEOs are matched with
229 firm-years with strong-FTR CEOs.
Our matched sample satisfies three important validity criteria (see e.g., Fang et al., 2014).
First, in Panel A of Table 11, we run a Logit model using the original sample and the matched
sample. The post-match regression in Column (2) shows that all the control variables are
statistically insignificant after matching. Second, as shown in Panel B, there is no difference in
the propensity score between observations with weak-FTR CEOs and those with strong-FTR
CEOs. Third, as shown in the lower part of Panel C, the differences in firm controls are mostly
insignificant.
The first two rows in Panel C show that R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales of firms with weak-
FTR CEOs are significantly higher than that of firms with strong-FTR CEOs. In Panel D,
we run regressions based on the matched sample, and find consistent evidence that weak-FTR
CEOs invest significantly more in R&D. This result confirms our earlier finding that weak FTR
has a positive effect on R&D, and more importantly, this positive effect is not driven by an
omitted unobservable country characteristic.
5.2.2 Belgium
Belgium has 11 provinces, and each province uses a dominant language of either Dutch or
French. We create a dummy variable Weak-FTR equal to 1 if a firm is located in a Dutch-
speaking province and 0 if a firm is located in a French-speaking province. We run the regression
of Equation (9) without the country-level controls. The result, reported in Table 12, shows
that R&D/Assets and R&D/Sales in weak-FTR regions are significantly higher than those in
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strong-FTR regions.13
5.2.3 Hong Kong: pre- and post-1997
An ideal experiment is to randomly assign weak- or strong-FTR languages to firms or
countries and see how R&D investment is affected. This type of natural experiment did not
occur in contemporary time.14 The 1997 handover of Hong Kong from the U.K. to China is a
quasi natural experiment in the sense that after 1997, Chinese (weak FTR) becomes a more
dominant language over English (strong FTR).15 We run a test to compare Hong Kong firms’
R&D investment before and after 1997. We use other “Asian Tigers” as the control group.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the test (tabulated in Appendix Table I) shows a significant
increase in R&D investment by Hong Kong firms after 1997. A caveat is that besides the
language effect, the 1997 event is accompanied by other confounding economic and political
changes. Nevertheless, this quasi natural experiment result is consistent with our theoretical
prediction and other empirical results.16
5.3 Further Robustness
Finally, we conduct a range of further robustness checks in Table 13. First, the classification
of the langauge FTR of multilingual countries can be difficult especially when the people of
a country speak both weak-FTR and strong-FTR languages. To address this issue, we drop
the multilingual countries, including Belgium, Switzerland, and Singapore, from our sample
and rerun the analysis. The results of both country-level and firm-level analyses are robust to
13Switzerland is another country where both strong- and weak-FTR languages are used. However, most Swiss
are multilingual, and firm CEOs’ first language is difficult to identify. Canada uses English and French, but
both are strong-FTR languages.
14It may have occurred in ancient times such as after the Tower of Babel or after colonization by a foreign
country, but the economic data are not available for those times.
15 Chapter 1 Article 9 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which serves as the constitutional document of Hong Kong
after 1997, states that: “In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language
by the executive authorities, legislature, and judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” Chen
et al. (2017) also employ the 1997 Hong Kong handover as a quasi-natural experiment.
16In Appendix Table II, we perform a Placebo test based on Canada with two strong-FTR official languages.
Given that English is weaker than French in terms of the degree of language of FTR, we test the effect a Placebo
Weak-FTR that takes the value of one if English is the official language in a province, and zero otherwise. As
expected, the coefficient on the Placebo Weak-FTR is insignificant.
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this subsample. In addition, to better capture the strength of language FTR of multilingual
countries, we use the weighted FTR measure proposed by Chen (2013). In particular, the FTR
values of multilingual countries are weighted by the proportions of their population speaking
each language. The results of both country-level and firm-level analyses are robust to this
alternative FTRmeasure.17 Second, we check whether our results are driven by small economies.
We exclude countries with relatively small economies – whose GDP are in the bottom quintile
of the sample. Weak-FTR are still significantly positive. Finally, our findings are also robust to
the inclusion of high-dimensional continent-by-year fixed effects that control for unobservable
time-varying continent-specific heterogeneity.
The empirical tests present consistent evidence that weak FTR is associated with higher
R&D investment. Various endogeneity checks suggest that the finding is unlikely to be driven
by omitted correlated variables. A natural extension of the R&D test is to examine whether
weak FTR also leads to more innovation output, such as measured by patent generation. We
empirically test this in the following section.
6 Innovation Output
We obtain country-level patent-based innovation output measure from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), namely PatOECD, defined as the number of
triadic patents reported by the OECD. The OECD patent data are particularly useful for cross-
country comparison of patents because the data cover triadic patents that are filed at three
major patent offices in different countries and thus are much less subject to the home bias that
domestic inventors tend to file only in their home country. After merging these patent measures
with the control variables used in Table 2, we have data for 34 countries over the period 1996-
2013. Table 14 reports the regression result of patent on Weak-FTR. In each regression we
control for the full set of control variables used in Table 2 and continent fixed effects. The
17One may argue that the effect of language FTR might be weaker for countries with higher international
exposure simply because people in these countries are exposed to foreign languages. We test this conjecture
in Appendix Table III. We use International Migrant (i.e. international migrant stock (% of population) ) as
a proxy for a country’s international exposure. We find a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction
between Weak-FTR and International Migrant, suggesting that international exposure weakens the effect of
language FTR on R&D investment.
24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518795 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262822 
results suggest that weak FTR is related to a higher level of innovation output, corroborating
the evidence based on R&D investment.
The patent result is intriguing – not only does weak FTR lead to greater R&D investment,
but this higher investment is also socially beneficial. R&D policy is at the center of economic
policy because R&D is a key driver of innovation and economic growth, yet private R&D falls
substantially below the socially optimal level (Jones & Williams, 1998; Brown et al., 2017).
If aware of the dampening effect of strong-FTR on R&D investment, policy makers in those
countries may start thinking about countervailing policy initiatives to promote R&D investment
and bring innovation closer to the socially optimal level.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Is language an economic institution that affects important resource-allocation decisions?
Our evidence suggests yes. We outline two economic channels through which a language’s am-
biguous encoding of future timing (weak FTR) leads to higher R&D investment. Country-level,
firm-level, and CEO-level tests all provide consistent evidence supporting the theoretical pre-
diction. The empirical evidence survives various robustness and endogeneity checks. Consistent
with the R&D evidence, we find that weak FTR is also associated with more innovation output
as measured by patent generation.
It is an interesting finding that language FTR is not highly correlated with various culture
attributes, and that the effect of FTR on R&D remains economically and statistically significant
while controlling for these culture attributes. Extensive evidence has shown that culture is an
important economic institution that influences a wide range of economic and finance decisions.
Does language, like culture, exert similar influences? This study provides evidence towards an
affirmative answer and suggests that language likely presents a fruitful area for future finance
research.
A particular challenge for future research is to identify the economic channels that FTR
or other language features affect decision making. We identify two economic channels through
which FTR can affect R&D investment. Future research may need to provide a different expla-
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nation for another language feature or another economic outcome. To overcome this challenge,
finance research will benefit from working with linguistics research to better understand how lin-
guistic features can influence decision making. This interdisciplinary approach can potentially
yield great rewards. Just as psychology and sociology (culture) have enriched our understanding
of finance, language can potentially provide new vantage points.
Finally, we want to note the prospects for policy implications. There is a strong theoretical
argument that because the benefit of R&D investment cannot be fully captured by the R&D
investor, private R&D investment will fall below the socially optimal level, potentially by as
much as 75% (Jones & Williams, 1998). As a result, significant attention has been given
to how formal institutions, such as policies, can encourage R&D investment (Brown et al.,
2017). We show that language, as an informal institution, significantly affects R&D and patent
generation. Does language FTR impose a constraint on the making and effectiveness of R&D
policies? And if so, in what ways? Similar policy-related questions have been raised in political
science research (Pérez & Tavits, 2017), and the answers may have wide-ranging implications.
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Appendix I: Country Language FTR and Business R&D/GDP
This table presents language FTR (weak vs. strong) and average Business R&D expenditures as a
percentage of GDP (R&D/GDP) of 52 countries over the period 1996-2013.
Nation Language FTR R&D/GDP Nation Language FTR R&D/GDP
Argentina strong 0.116 Korea (South) strong 2.126
Australia strong 1.068 Luxembourg weak 1.214
Austria weak 1.679 Malaysia weak 0.520
Belgium weak 1.348 Mexico strong 0.139
Bermuda strong 0.015 Morocco strong 0.180
Bulgaria strong 0.172 Netherlands weak 0.968
Canada strong 1.038 New Zealand strong 0.443
Chile strong 0.118 Norway weak 0.867
China weak 0.850 Peru strong 0.015
Colombia strong 0.045 Philippines strong 0.078
Croatia strong 0.367 Poland strong 0.222
Cyprus strong 0.068 Portugal strong 0.400
Czech Republic strong 0.735 Romania strong 0.249
Denmark weak 1.684 Russian Federation strong 0.730
Finland weak 2.281 Singapore strong 1.268
France strong 1.339 South Africa strong 0.424
Germany weak 1.710 Spain strong 0.571
Greece strong 0.185 Sri Lanka strong 0.028
Hong Kong weak 0.269 Sweden weak 2.474
Hungary strong 0.481 Switzerland weak 1.896
India strong 0.214 Thailand strong 0.096
Indonesia weak 0.018 Turkey strong 0.238
Ireland strong 0.885 United Arab. strong 0.140
Israel strong 3.071 United Kingdom strong 1.071
Italy strong 0.562 United States strong 1.845
Japan weak 2.393 Vietnam strong 0.040
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Appendix II: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Panel A: Dependent variables
Business
R&D/GDP
Country-level: domestic expenditures on R&D by business enter-




Country-level: total domestic expenditures on R&D divided by GDP UNESCO
PatOECD Country-level: the number of triadic patents filed at the European,
Japanese, and U.S. patent offices (scaled by 1000)
OECD
R&D/Assets Firm-level: R&D expenditures, divided by total assets Worldscope
R&D/Sales Firm-level: R&D expenditures, divided by sales Worldscope
Capex/Assets Firm-level: Capital expenditures, divided by total assets Worldscope
Panel B: Language-based measures of perceived reward-timing uncertainty
Weak-FTR Dummy=1 if the official language of a nation is classified as a weak
future-time reference (FTR) language
Chen (2013)
Verb Ratio In the country’s weather forecast: the number of verbs that are
grammatically future-marked, divided by the total number of future-
referring verbs
Chen (2013)
Sentence Ratio In the country’s weather forecast: the proportion of sentences re-
garding the future which contain a grammatical future marker
Chen (2013)
Panel C: Firm-level control variables
Firm Size The logarithm of total assets in U.S. dollars Worldscope
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets Worldscope
Market-to-Book Firm market value (i.e., total assets - common equity + market
capitalization), divided by total assets
Worldscope
Profitability EBITDA divided by total assets Worldscope
Tangibility PP&E divided by total assets Worldscope
Cash Ratio Cash divided by total assets Worldscope
Capital Intensity The logarithm of the ratio of total assets in U.S. dollars to the num-
ber of employees
Worldscope
CF Volatility The industry-average standard deviation of firm profitability in the
past five years, using DataStream Level 3 industry classification.
Worldscope
R&D-missing Dummy=1 if R&D observation is missing Worldscope
IFRS Dummy=1 if a firm follows the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), and 0 otherwise
Worldscope
Panel D: Country-level control variables
GDP per capita The logarithm of GDP in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, divided by
midyear population
World Bank
Stock Market Market capitalization of listed domestic companies, as a percentage
of GDP (scaled by 100)
World Bank
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(continued from the previous page)
UK Legal Origin Dummy=1 for UK legal origin La Porta et al. (2008)
French L. O. Dummy=1 for French legal origin La Porta et al. (2008)
German L. O. Dummy=1 for German legal origin La Porta et al. (2008)
Scand. L. O. Dummy=1 for Scandinavian legal origin La Porta et al. (2008)
Shareholder
Rights
The anti-self-dealing index, a measure of shareholder protec-
tion against expropriation by firm directors
Djankov et al. (2008)
Creditor Rights Creditor rights aggregate score between 0 and 4, measuring
the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors
Djankov et al. (2007)
Patent Rights An index of patent protection, considering five aspects of
patents: coverage; membership in international treaties; du-
ration of protection; enforcement mechanisms; and restric-
tions
Park (2008)
Catholic Dummy=1 if the largest proportion of a country’s population
practices catholic religion
La Porta et al. (2008)
Individualism National culture index related to the level of individualism
in a society (scaled by 100)
Hofstede Website
Uncertainty Avo. National culture index related to the level of uncertainty
avoidance in a society (scaled by 100)
Hofstede Website
Power Distance National culture index related to power distance between
different members of a society (scaled by 100)
Hofstede Website
Masculinity National culture index related to the level of masculinity in
a society (scaled by 100)
Hofstede Website
Long-term Ort. National culture index related to the long-term orientation
of a society (the score is constructed based on the World
Value Survey) (scaled by 100)
Hofstede Website
Trust The percentage of survey respondents who believe that most
people can be trusted
World Value Survey
Time Preference The percentage of survey participants in each country who
prefer option B in the following binary choice question:
"Which offer would you prefer? A. a payment of $3400 this
month; B. a payment of $3800 next month."
Wang et al. (2016)
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Panel A
Panel B
Figure 1: The effects of future timing perception on valuation
The curves in both panels represent the perceived present value (PV) of a future reward over time t. In
Panel A, we show how “time preference” affects valuation over the same future reward, assuming that
there is no timing uncertainty. A speaker of weak-FTR language perceives the future to be closer to
the present and discounts a future reward less, so her valuation (PV2) is higher. In Panel B, we show
how “timing uncertainty” affects the valuation of the same future reward, assuming the same discount
rate. A speaker of weak-FTR language perceives greater timing uncertainty, so her valuation (PV2) is
higher.
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Figure 2: Mean Business R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP (52 countries, 1996-2013)
The figure shows the mean Business R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP in different countries. Light-colored bars represent
weak-FTR countries, while dark-colored bars represent strong-FTR countries. The classification of weak-FTR and strong-FTR languages

















































































Figure 3: Mean Total R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP (52 countries, 1996-2013)
The figure shows the mean Total R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP in different countries. Light-colored bars represent weak-FTR
countries, while dark-colored bars represent strong-FTR countries. The classification of weak-FTR and strong-FTR languages is based

















































































Table 1: Country-level Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in our country-level analysis. Our
sample comprises over 400 country-year observations from 39 countries in the 1996-2013 period. All
variables are defined in Appendix II.
N Mean Median SD Min Max
Business R&D/GDP 435 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.038
Total R&D/GDP 459 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.045
Weak-FTR 459 0.292 0.000 0.455 0.000 1.000
Verb Ratio 386 0.519 0.716 0.371 0.000 1.000
Sentence Ratio 386 0.559 0.741 0.390 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita 459 9.455 9.908 1.142 6.399 11.125
Stock Market 459 0.824 0.580 0.942 0.004 6.060
Credit Market 459 0.907 0.910 0.541 0.088 2.036
Individualism 459 0.493 0.480 0.245 0.130 0.910
Uncertainty Avo. 459 0.657 0.750 0.230 0.080 0.950
Power Distance 459 0.564 0.570 0.193 0.130 1.040
Masculinity 459 0.524 0.520 0.182 0.050 0.950
Long-term Ort. 459 0.516 0.499 0.226 0.131 1.000
Trust 459 0.303 0.281 0.142 0.056 0.693
UK Legal Origin 459 0.329 0.000 0.470 0.000 1.000
French L. O. 459 0.342 0.000 0.475 0.000 1.000
German L. O. 459 0.281 0.000 0.450 0.000 1.000
Shareholder Rights 459 0.530 0.461 0.244 0.178 1.000
Creditor Rights 459 1.911 2.000 1.150 0.000 4.000
Patent Rights 459 3.916 4.000 0.706 1.380 4.880
Catholic 459 0.401 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000
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Table 2: Correlations among R&D and Formal and Informal Institutions
This table presents correlation coefficients between country-level R&D and country-specific language, economic, cultural, legal, and religion
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix II.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(1) Business R&D/GDP
(2) Total R&D/GDP 0.99
(3) Weak-FTR 0.28 0.26
(4) Verb Ratio -0.09 -0.08 -0.88
(5) Sentence Ratio -0.08 -0.07 -0.90 0.99
(6) GDP per capita 0.60 0.67 0.22 -0.09 -0.08
(7) Stock Market 0.10 0.11 0.30 -0.23 -0.23 0.34
(8) Credit Market 0.48 0.51 0.33 -0.17 -0.17 0.61 0.45
(9) Individualism 0.29 0.41 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.64 -0.05 0.32
(10) Uncertainty Avo. -0.07 -0.10 -0.29 0.26 0.25 -0.17 -0.54 -0.36 -0.08
(11) Power Distance -0.53 -0.57 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.58 0.04 -0.27 -0.66 0.01
(12) Masculinity 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.08
(13) Long-term Ort. 0.41 0.41 0.36 -0.33 -0.31 0.21 0.10 0.33 -0.11 -0.05 0.08 0.06
(14) Trust 0.32 0.39 0.46 -0.44 -0.43 0.45 0.24 0.46 0.38 -0.44 -0.46 -0.22 0.26
(15) UK Legal Origin 0.13 0.10 -0.18 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.44 0.32 0.10 -0.63 -0.16 0.04 -0.25 0.12
(16) French L. O. -0.41 -0.39 -0.12 0.16 0.13 -0.16 -0.21 -0.31 -0.14 0.40 0.26 -0.20 -0.30 -0.42 -0.50
(17) German L. O. 0.19 0.19 0.15 -0.30 -0.26 -0.00 -0.24 0.03 -0.04 0.31 0.03 0.40 0.63 0.08 -0.44 -0.45
(18) Shareholder Rights 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.28 0.27 0.02 0.48 0.34 -0.18 -0.62 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.12 0.76 -0.46 -0.26
(19) Creditor Rights 0.22 0.25 0.23 -0.13 -0.12 0.31 0.40 0.43 0.07 -0.45 -0.24 -0.10 0.43 0.35 0.41 -0.46 0.10 0.53
(20) Patent Rights 0.55 0.62 0.17 -0.11 -0.09 0.77 0.18 0.54 0.60 -0.11 -0.37 0.06 0.31 0.33 -0.12 -0.07 0.15 -0.08 0.16

















































































Table 3: Weak Future-Time Reference (FTR) and National R&D investment
This table presents evidence on how language FTR affects national R&D investment. Our sample
comprises country-year observations from 39 countries in the 1996-2013 period. We use two alternative
measures of national R&D investment: Business R&D/GDP in Columns (1)-(4) and Total R&D/GDP
in Columns (5)-(8). Business R&D/GDP is defined as domestic expenditures on R&D by business
enterprises as a percentage of GDP. Total R&D/GDP is defined as total domestic expenditures on
R&D during a given year as a percentage of GDP. The measure of language future-time reference
(FTR) is the dummy variable, Weak-FTR, which is equal to one if a country’s dominant language is
identified as a weak-FTR language based on Chen (2013). All columns use OLS regressions. Year and
continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE and Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. An intercept is included but
not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix II.
(continuing on the next page...)
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Dependent Var. Business R&D/GDP Total R&D/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak-FTR 0.002*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(3.17) (2.38) (4.64) (3.34) (3.61) (3.87) (6.15) (3.59)
GDP per capita 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(12.30) (8.09) (4.46) (6.09) (13.83) (8.81) (7.99) (10.31)
Stock Market -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(-6.35) (-5.15) (-5.61) (-3.71) (-7.41) (-6.64) (-7.07) (-4.45)
Credit Market 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.000 0.001
(4.68) (2.10) (2.15) (2.09) (4.78) (1.67) (0.57) (0.99)
UK Legal Origin -0.000 0.007*** 0.004 0.002 0.007*** 0.003
(-0.04) (3.65) (1.60) (0.78) (3.39) (1.28)
French L. O. -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.005**
(-3.45) (-3.57) (-2.41) (-3.63) (-2.25) (-2.23)
German L. O. -0.001 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.004** -0.000
(-0.60) (-3.78) (-1.07) (-0.85) (-2.05) (-0.12)
Shareholder Rights -0.000 -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*
(-0.23) (-5.56) (-3.92) (-2.83) (-2.93) (-1.66)
Creditor Rights -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004***
(-1.54) (-13.39) (-13.28) (-1.17) (-11.28) (-13.68)
Patent Rights 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(6.19) (7.19) (5.42) (7.30) (8.32) (6.70)
Individualism -0.015*** -0.000 -0.012*** 0.010***
(-9.40) (-0.00) (-6.38) (4.10)
Uncertainty Avo. 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 0.001
(2.54) (0.82) (2.27) (0.55)
Power Distance -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.020***
(-11.28) (-10.09) (-10.20) (-9.11)
Masculinity 0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.011***
(1.01) (-4.16) (-0.66) (-6.91)
Long-term Ort. 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(13.16) (6.43) (10.30) (7.39)
Trust -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.016***
(-5.11) (-5.08) (-5.01) (-5.80)
Catholic -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-7.34) (-6.37) (-6.90) (-6.02)
Continent FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
N 435 435 435 435 459 459 459 459
adj. R2 0.418 0.520 0.798 0.824 0.510 0.617 0.812 0.858
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Table 4: Firm-level Summary Statistics
This table presents firm-level summary statistics for the main variables used in our study. All variables
are defined in Appendix II.
N Mean Median SD Min Max
R&D/Assets 215,877 0.025 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.433
R&D/Sales 215,877 0.042 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.826
Weak-FTR 215,877 0.349 0.000 0.477 0.000 1.000
Verb Ratio 191,286 0.541 0.769 0.390 0.000 1.000
Sentence Ratio 191,286 0.599 0.875 0.428 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita 215,877 10.024 10.431 1.013 6.519 10.880
Stock Market 215,877 1.178 0.923 1.525 0.143 10.769
Credit Market 215,877 1.347 1.350 0.484 0.218 2.193
Individualism 215,877 0.628 0.710 0.279 0.140 0.910
Uncertainty Avo. 215,877 0.567 0.460 0.226 0.080 0.950
Power Distance 215,877 0.510 0.400 0.171 0.130 1.040
Masculinity 215,877 0.614 0.620 0.180 0.050 0.950
Long-term Ort. 215,877 0.551 0.511 0.259 0.212 1.000
Trust 215,877 0.354 0.372 0.100 0.056 0.693
UK Legal Origin 215,877 0.557 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000
French L. O. 215,877 0.116 0.000 0.321 0.000 1.000
German L. O. 215,877 0.308 0.000 0.462 0.000 1.000
Shareholder Rights 215,877 0.625 0.651 0.209 0.178 1.000
Creditor Rights 215,877 2.098 2.000 1.164 0.000 4.000
Patent Rights 215,877 4.333 4.540 0.581 1.020 4.880
Catholic 215,877 0.128 0.000 0.334 0.000 1.000
Firm Size 215,877 12.213 12.193 2.096 6.258 16.961
Tangibility 215,877 0.297 0.258 0.220 0.003 0.913
Profitability 215,877 0.036 0.098 0.335 -2.358 0.462
Leverage 215,877 0.236 0.189 0.245 0.000 1.565
Market-to-Book 215,877 1.906 1.267 2.141 0.456 16.120
Capital Intensity 215,877 5.418 5.371 1.173 2.641 8.756
Cash Ratio 215,877 0.109 0.062 0.133 0.000 0.703
CF Volatility 215,877 0.778 0.285 1.604 0.021 9.112
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Table 5: Weak Future-Time Reference (FTR) and Firm-level R&D
This table presents evidence on how FTR affects firm R&D investment. The dependent variable is
R&D/Assets in Columns (1)-(3) and R&D/Sales in Columns (4)-(6). R&D/Assets is defined as R&D
expenditures divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures divided by annual
sales. Weak-FTR is equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR language,
based on Chen (2013). All columns use OLS regressions. We control for a large set of country and
firm characteristics, which are all defined in Appendix II. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are
denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported.
(continuing on the next page...)
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Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weak-FTR 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003* 0.017*** 0.013***
(5.04) (10.49) (8.81) (1.66) (9.61) (7.36)
Firm Size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-3.09) (-2.79) (-5.28) (-4.64)
Tangibility -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** -0.006**
(-1.16) (-1.23) (-2.31) (-2.52)
Profitability -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.111*** -0.110***
(-30.17) (-29.96) (-36.95) (-36.72)
Leverage -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.042*** -0.042***
(-10.20) (-10.17) (-15.00) (-14.95)
Market-to-Book 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(11.52) (11.38) (8.61) (8.35)
Capital Intensity 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(10.80) (10.61) (29.95) (29.99)
Cash Ratio 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.128*** 0.130***
(17.84) (17.93) (21.89) (22.14)
CF Volatility -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-6.11) (-6.41) (-6.65) (-4.40)
R&D-missing -0.045*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.075*** -0.054*** -0.055***
(-70.63) (-65.31) (-65.54) (-56.22) (-52.06) (-52.32)
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002*
(-0.02) (0.44) (2.07) (-3.91) (-2.82) (-1.83)
Stock Market -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.002***
(-1.40) (-10.10) (-8.34) (0.48) (-9.26) (-7.31)
Credit Market 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.039*** -0.002 -0.004**
(15.41) (3.09) (1.71) (17.77) (-1.42) (-2.18)
UK Legal Origin 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.035***
(6.53) (4.45) (4.28) (3.68) (5.35) (5.67)
French L. O. 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.029***
(7.00) (3.59) (4.13) (4.98) (3.56) (4.57)
German L. O. 0.018*** 0.002 0.005 0.020** 0.004 0.013*
(4.22) (0.58) (1.51) (2.27) (0.50) (1.79)
Shareholder Rights -0.006** -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.009* 0.008
(-2.14) (-0.45) (-0.01) (-0.81) (1.90) (1.56)
Creditor Rights -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-10.81) (-6.04) (-6.04) (-7.63) (-4.28) (-4.36)
Patent Rights 0.001 -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.003*** -0.010*** -0.013***
(1.11) (-8.63) (-9.43) (2.64) (-9.58) (-9.20)
Individualism -0.032*** -0.016*** -0.006 -0.065*** -0.023*** -0.008
(-8.41) (-4.52) (-1.61) (-8.43) (-3.11) (-0.98)
Uncertainty Avo. -0.022*** -0.003 -0.005** -0.043*** -0.002 -0.006
(-9.54) (-1.56) (-2.35) (-9.41) (-0.36) (-1.41)
Power Distance -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.085*** -0.047*** -0.037***
(-9.14) (-7.72) (-6.45) (-8.52) (-5.63) (-4.42)
Masculinity -0.014*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.025*** -0.008 -0.010*
(-5.18) (-0.80) (-1.21) (-4.25) (-1.55) (-1.95)
Long-term Orientation -0.030*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.053*** -0.016** -0.018***
(-8.44) (-3.76) (-3.47) (-7.19) (-2.46) (-2.72)
Trust -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.068*** -0.032*** -0.020***
(-7.92) (-6.55) (-5.64) (-8.53) (-4.37) (-2.77)
Catholic -0.014*** -0.003** -0.004** -0.018*** 0.000 -0.002
(-7.14) (-2.06) (-2.48) (-4.52) (0.10) (-0.64)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
N 215,877 215,877 215,877 215,877 215,877 215,877
adj. R2 0.204 0.386 0.387 0.150 0.377 0.378
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Table 6: Alternative Measures of FTR and Firm-level R&D
This table presents evidence on how alternative measure of FTR affects firm R&D investment. The de-
pendent variable is R&D/Assets in Columns (1)-(2) and R&D/Sales in Columns (3)-(4). R&D/Assets
is defined as R&D expenditures divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures di-
vided by annual sales. The alternative FTR measures are Verb Ratio and Sentence Ratio, proposed by
Chen (2013). Verb Ratio is the number of verbs in a country’s weather forecast that are grammatically
future-marked divided by the total number of future-referring verbs. Sentence Ratio is the proportion
of sentences in a country’s weather forecast regarding the future which contains a grammatical future
marker. All columns use OLS regressions. Country controls are the full set of country-level control
variables in Table 5. Firm controls are the full set of firm-level control variables in Table 5. Year,
industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All variables are
defined in Appendix II.
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Verb Ratio -0.004*** -0.011***
(-2.88) (-3.94)
Sentence Ratio -0.004*** -0.011***
(-3.09) (-4.16)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 191,286 191,286 191,286 191,286
adj. R2 0.390 0.390 0.384 0.384
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Table 7: FTR and Firm-level R&D: Correlated Random Effects
This table presents correlated-random-effects estimation results. The dependent variable is
R&D/Assets in Column (1) and R&D/Sales in Column (2). R&D/Assets is defined as R&D ex-
penditures divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures divided by annual
sales. Weak-FTR is equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR lan-
guage, based on Chen (2013). We control for a large set of country and firm characteristics, which
are all defined in Appendix II. To estimate the correlated-random-effects model, in addition to the
full set of control variables in Table 5, we also include the averages of the country-level and firm-level
controls which are reported in this table. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as
Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected
for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported.




Avg_GDP per capita -0.014*** -0.015***
(-8.62) (-4.58)
Avg_Stock Market -0.002*** -0.003***
(-4.09) (-3.13)
Avg_Credit Market -0.011*** 0.003
(-6.61) (0.88)










Avg_Capital Intensity 0.010*** 0.015***
(27.58) (19.09)
Avg_Cash Ratio 0.066*** 0.161***
(22.30) (25.83)
Avg_CF Volatility -0.003*** -0.004***
(-9.45) (-5.76)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 215,877 215,877
adj. R2 0.398 0.392
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Table 8: Firm-level Robustness Tests
This table presents various firm-level robustness tests. Columns (1)-(2) exclude US firms. Columns (3)-(8) are based on three sub-periods.
Columns (9)-(10) exclude observations with missing R&D. Columns (11)-(12) control for IFRS. Columns (13)-(14) use the Tobit estimator.
Column (15)-(16) control for lagged R&D. The dependent variable is R&D/Assets in odd-numbered columns, and R&D/Sales in even-
numbered columns. R&D/Assets is defined as R&D expenditures divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures
divided by annual sales. Weak-FTR is equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR language, based on Chen
(2013). All columns use OLS regressions. We control for a large set of country and firm characteristics, which are all defined in Appendix
II. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported.
Non-US Firms Sub-period: 1993-1999 Sub-period: 2000-2007 Sub-period: 2008-2014
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak-FTR 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.005* 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.007**
(8.17) (5.64) (3.87) (1.69) (8.83) (8.23) (4.05) (2.50)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 159871 159871 61393 61393 87694 87694 66790 66790
adj. R2 0.322 0.295 0.421 0.386 0.387 0.383 0.382 0.383
Non-missing R&D Control for IFRS Tobit Regression Control for lagged R&D
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Weak-FTR 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.002*** 0.003***





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110409 110409 215877 215877 215877 215877 171767 171767

















































































Table 9: Time Preference or Reward-timing Uncertainty?
This table presents OLS estimation results to examine whether the positive relation between weak-
FTR and R&D is due to managers’ time preference or reward-timing uncertainty. Column (1) controls
for Time Preference, an indicator of low subjective discount rate constructed by Wang et al. (2016).
Column (2) investigates the effects of language FTR on firm capital expenditures (Capex). Column
(3) further examines how language FTR affects the ratio of R&D over R&D plus Capex. Weak-FTR
is a dummy variable equal to one if a country’s dominant language is a weak-FTR language. Country
controls and firm controls are those in Table 5. We also control for year, industry, and continent fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All
variables are defined in Appendix II.
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets Capex/Assets R&D/(R&D+Capex)
(1) (2) (3)




Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 197,301 215,877 213,859
adj. R2 0.388 0.296 0.552
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Table 10: 2SLS
This table presents 2SLS results. The dependent variable is Weak-FTR in all the first stage regressions. The instrumental variable is Crop
Return which is the pre-1500 CE crop return (Galor et al., 2018). Columns (1)-(4) present the country-level regressions. The dependent
variable is Business R&D/GDP in Column (1) and Total R&D/GDP in Column (3). Columns (5)-(8) present the firm-level regressions.
The dependent variable is R&D/Assets in Column (5) and R&D/Sales in Column (7). R&D/Assets is defined as R&D expenditures
divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures divided by annual sales. Weak-FTR is equal to one if a country’s
dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR language, based on Chen (2013). All columns use OLS regressions. We control for a large
set of country and firm characteristics, which are all defined in Appendix II. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as
Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported.
Country Level Firm Level
Dependent Var. Business R&D/GDP Weak-FTR Total R&D/GDP Weak-FTR R&D/Assets Weak-FTR R&D/Sales Weak-FTR
(2nd stage) (1st stage) (2nd stage) (1st stage) (2nd stage) (1st stage) (2nd stage) (1st stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak-FTR (Instrumented) 0.023*** 0.035*** 0.013*** 0.025***
(4.28) (2.88) (4.13) (3.68)
Crop Return -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.075*** -0.075***
(-5.09) (-2.79) (-18.51) (-18.51)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 435 435 459 459 215,877 215,877 215,877 215,877
adj. R2 0.438 0.105 0.387 0.377

















































































Table 11: Within-country Evidence: United States
This table provides within-country evidence for U.S. firms over the sample period 1991-2013. For each obser-
vation with a weak-FTR CEO, we match an observation with a strong-FTR CEO in the same year, employing
a propensity-score-matching approach. In Panel A, we report results from Logit regressions used to calculate
the propensity scores for the matching procedure, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable set to
one if the firm has a weak-FTR CEO and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) respectively show marginal
effects for the full sample before matching and the subsample with matched observations. Panel B displays the
distribution of propensity scores from the regression in Column (2) of Panel A. Panel C compares R&D levels
between firms with weak-FTR CEOs vs. firms with strong-FTR CEOs. Panel D presents the regression results
based on the matched sample. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All variables
are defined in Appendix II.
Panel A: Pre-Match and Post-Match Logit Regression
Pre-Match Regression Post-Match Regression
(1) (2)










Capital Intensity -0.315*** 0.058
(-4.033) (0.487)
N 19,946 458
pseudo R2 0.042 0.008
Panel B: Estimated Propensity Score Distributions
Propensity score Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max SD
Weak-FTR CEO 0.023 0.002 0.011 0.018 0.029 0.157 0.019
Strong-FTR CEO 0.023 0.002 0.011 0.018 0.028 0.156 0.019
Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000
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Panel C: Difference in R&D and Other Firm Characteristics
With weak-FTR CEOs With strong-FTR CEOs
Difference
Mean SD N Mean SD N
R&D/Assets 0.073 0.109 229 0.043 0.079 229 0.030***
R&D/Sales 0.264 0.631 229 0.129 0.428 229 0.135***
Firm controls:
Firm Size 13.498 2.065 229 13.634 1.940 229 -0.136
Leverage 0.178 0.166 229 0.184 0.169 229 -0.006
Market-to-Book 2.159 1.565 229 1.997 1.287 229 0.162
Profitability 0.015 0.289 229 0.058 0.249 229 -0.043*
Tangibility 0.229 0.185 229 0.227 0.183 229 0.002
Capital Intensity 5.434 1.084 229 5.377 0.960 229 0.057
Panel D: Regression Using Matched Sample
R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2)
Weak-FTR CEO 0.017** 0.057**
(2.42) (2.17)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 458 458
adj. R2 0.252 0.196
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Table 12: Within-country Evidence: Belgium
This table presents within-country estimation of FTR on firm R&D investment in Belgium, where some
regions speak weak-FTR langues while other regions speak strong-FTR languages. The dependent
variable is R&D/Assets in Columns (1) and R&D/Sales in Columns (2). R&D/Assets is defined as
R&D expenditures divided by book assets. R&D/Sales is defined as R&D expenditures divided by
annual sales. Weak-FTR is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is headquartered in a region
where the main language is of weak FTR, and zero otherwise. Country controls are the full set of
country-level control variables in Table 5. Firm controls are the full set of firm-level control variables
in Table 5. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and
Continent FE. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level. All variables are defined in Appendix II.




Firm Controls Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1,495 1,495
adj. R2 0.441 0.324
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Table 13: Further Robustness Tests
This table presents further robustness tests. Panel A presents country-level regressions and Panel B presents firm-level regressions.
Columns (1)-(2) exclude multilingual countries. Columns (3)-(4) use population-weighted Weak-FTR as an alternative explanatory
variable. Columns (5)-(6) exclude countries with small economies (i.e., total GDP in the bottom quintile). Columns (7)-(8) control for
continent-by-year fixed effects. are based on three sub-periods. In Panel A, the dependent variable is Business R&D/GDP in odd-numbered
columns, and Total R&D/GDP in even-numbered columns. In Panel B, the dependent variable is R&D/Assets in odd-numbered columns,
and R&D/Sales in even-numbered columns. Weak-FTR is equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR
language, based on Chen (2013). All columns use OLS regressions. We control for a large set of country and firm characteristics, which are
all defined in Appendix II. Year, industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported. (Note: B. R&D/GDP = Business R&D/GDP, T.
R&D/GDP = Total R&D/GDP)
Panel A: Country-level Regressions
Excluding Multilingual Countries Population-weighted Weak-FTR Excluding Small Economies Continent-Year Fixed Effects
Depdent Var. B. R&D/GDP T. R&D/GDP B. R&D/GDP T. R&D/GDP B. R&D/GDP T. R&D/GDPs B. R&D/GDP T. R&D/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak-FTR 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(2.15) (3.17) (3.35) (3.62) (2.90) (2.94) (3.38) (3.82)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 413 437 435 459 353 367 435 459
adj. R2 0.825 0.856 0.824 0.857 0.841 0.879 0.819 0.852
Panel B: Firm-level Regressions
Excluding Multilingual Countries Population-weighted Weak-FTR Excluding Small Economies Continent-Year Fixed Effects
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak-FTR 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.0041** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.017***
(9.94) (8.53) (8.72) (7.74) (2.21) (3.18) (10.08) (8.81)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 210,210 210,210 215,877 215,877 195,809 195,809 215,877 215,877

















































































Table 14: Innovation Output
This table presents evidence on how FTR affects country-level innovation output. The dependent
variable in Column (1) is PatOECD, defined as the number of triadic patents (registered in multiple
countries) reported in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) triadic
patent families database. The dependent variable in Column (2) is PatOECD measured on a per capita
basis. Weak-FTR is a dummy variable equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a
weak-FTR language. We control for the full set of country-level control variables used in Table 3 and
continent and year fixed effects. All columns use OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. An intercept is included but not reported.
All variables are defined in Appendix II.




GDP per capita 1.08*** 0.01***
(5.06) (6.42)
Stock Market -0.40*** -0.00**
(-3.18) (-2.50)
Credit Market 2.96*** 0.02***
(9.38) (6.41)
Shareholder Rights 0.65 -0.02***
(0.71) (-2.79)
Creditor Rights -1.66*** -0.02***
(-10.81) (-12.85)




Uncertainty Avo. 5.95*** 0.02**
(5.86) (2.27)










Continent FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 424 424
adj. R2 0.855 0.817
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Appendix Table I: Hong Kong – before and after 1997
This table compares R&D investment in Hong Kong before and after 1997. In Columns (1) and (2),
we use firms located in the other two Asian Tigers, namely Singapore and South Korea, as the control
group. The sample comprises 4,083 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2001. In Columns (3) and (4),
we use firms located in countries affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as the control group. The
sample comprises 6,868 firm-year observations from 1994-2001. The dependent variable is R&D/Assets
or R&D/Sales. Hong Kong is a dummy variable that is equal to one for firms based in Hong Kong, and
zero otherwise. Post-1997 is a dummy variable that is set to one after the 1997 Hong Kong transfer of
sovereignty from the U.K. to China, and zero otherwise. Country controls are the full set of country-
level control variables in Table 5. Firm controls are the full set of firm-level control variables in Table 5.
Year and industry fixed effects are denoted as Year FE and Industry FE. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All variables are defined in Appendix II.
Sample Asian Tigers Countries Affected by the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hong Kong * Post-1997 0.004*** 0.005** 0.002** 0.004**
(2.99) (2.35) (2.55) (2.42)
Post-1997 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001** -0.002**
(-3.41) (-2.88) (-2.54) (-2.35)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,083 4,083 6,868 6,868
adj. R2 0.171 0.123 0.149 0.108
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Appendix Table II: Placebo Tests - Canada
This table presents within-country Placebo tests of FTR on firm R&D investment in Canada,
where there are two strong-FTR official languages (English and French). The dependent variable
is R&D/Assets in Columns (1) and R&D/Sales in Columns (2). Placebo Weak-FTR is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm is headquartered in a province where the main language is English (En-
glish is relatively weaker than French in terms of language FTR), and zero otherwise. Firm controls
are the full set of firm-level control variables in Table 5. Year and industry fixed effects are denoted as
Year FE and Industry FE, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected
for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All variables are defined in Appendix II.
Dependent Var. R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2)
Placebo Weak-FTR 0.001 -0.020
(0.255) (-0.812)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 4,897 4,897
adj. R2 0.560 0.464
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Appendix Table III: The Moderating Effect of International Exposure
This table presents the moderating effects of international exposure on the relation between FTR and
R&D investment at both the country and firm levels. Columns (1)-(2) present country-level regressions
and Columns (3)-(4) present firm-level regressions. In Columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is
Business R&D/GDP, Total R&D/GDP, R&D/Assets, and R&D/Sales, respectively. Weak-FTR is
equal to one if a country’s dominant language is identified as a weak-FTR language, based on Chen
(2013). Our proxy for international exposure is International Migrant defined as international migrant
stock as a percentage of population (data source: World Bank). All columns use OLS regressions. We
control for a large set of country and firm characteristics, which are all defined in Appendix II. Year,
industry, and continent fixed effects are denoted as Year FE, Industry FE, and Continent FE. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Country Level Firm Level
Dependent Var. Business R&D/GDP Total R&D/GDP R&D/Assets R&D/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weak-FTR*International Migrant -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-9.77) (-11.39) (-7.80) (-7.41)
Weak-FTR 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.017***
(7.84) (6.90) (10.02) (8.38)
International Migrant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(5.31) (7.01) (5.94) (6.27)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 435 459 215,877 215,877
adj. R2 0.864 0.895 0.387 0.378
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